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Creswell: The Question
BOOK REVIEWS

and their legitimacy in the eyes of the
affected constituencies, on the other.”
Overall, the two books do an estimable
job of delineating programmatically
what states seeking to counter terrorism
can and need to do. In so doing, they
also invite more specific and granular
analyses of precisely how to do it.

to electric shock and water boarding.
He was even administered Pentothal, or
“truth serum.” Despite these outrages,
Alleg refused to break, earning him
both wrath and grudging respect from
his tormentors. He escaped from prison
in October 1961, just months before the
war ended.

JONATHAN STEVENSON

Fifty years later, Alleg’s voice remains as
reasoned and penetrating as ever. He laments that France’s political elite have
attempted to purge the Algerian War
and its attendant horrors from the
country’s official memory; many military men responsible for these crimes,
he notes, have received not only amnesty but promotion and praise. Only
in 2000 did the French government admit that it had perpetrated widespread
torture and other abuses during this period. Ironically, one former torturer
proudly admitted to his actions in a
2001 book, causing such a backlash that
he was punished, albeit lightly. However, Alleg insists that even this slap on
the wrist signals a shift in official
French thinking.

Naval War College

Alleg, Henri. The Question. Lincoln: Univ. of
Nebraska Press, 2006. 74pp. $16.95

During France’s Algerian War (1954–
62), the French journalist Henri Alleg
sided with the insurgents. Arrested by
French authorities in June 1957, Alleg
was detained and tortured. During his
confinement he managed to write and
smuggle out an account of his experiences. Originally published in 1958,
The Question was quickly banned by
the French government, the first such
action France had taken since the eighteenth century. The book nonetheless
became a sensation.
Reissued after half a century, this new
edition retains its preface by French
novelist and philosopher Jean-Paul
Sartre, now supplemented with a foreword by author Ellen Ray, an introduction by author James D. Le Sueur, and a
new afterword by Alleg himself.
The book’s title euphemistically refers
to torture. In calm and lucid prose,
Alleg describes his fate at the hands of
his captors. Held for a month in Algeria’s El Biar prison, Alleg was tortured
by French paras (paratroopers) before
being transferred to another prison,
where he composed The Question. His
“interrogations” ranged from beatings
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The accompanying essays deserve mention. Ray minces no words, accusing
the United States of pursuing a “strategy that incorporates racism, torture,
and murder” in its current conflicts.
Seeing America as headed down a moral
slippery slope, she wonders if it might go
the way of the French Fourth Republic
or whether “Americans might be the defendants in future war crimes trials.”
Le Sueur provides background on
Alleg’s experiences and the debate that
The Question aroused in France. He argues that present-day France has yet to
come to grips with its sordid conduct.
In fact, the French parliament passed a
law in February 2005 enjoining educators to teach the “positive role” of
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French imperialism and to recognize
the “sacrifices” made by France’s armed
forces in the Algerian War.
Sartre is biting in his psychological dissection of both torturer and victim. He
maintains that torture stems from racial
hatred and that only by believing an individual to be less than human can one
justify torture.
We should be grateful for this timely
republication of The Question, as it reminds France of a chapter in its history
it has tried hard to forget. It is also evidence that fighting terrorists by sacrificing one’s humanity ensures not just a
long war but an endless one.
MICHAEL H. CRESWELL
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Evans, Michael. The Tyranny of Dissonance: Australia’s Strategic Culture and Way of War, 1901–
2005. Duntroon, ACT, Australia: Land Warfare
Studies Centre, 2005. Available online at www.
defence.gov.au/army/LWSC/Publications/SP/
SP_306.pdf.

In this excellent monograph, Michael
Evans argues that Australia has a distinctive way of war that focuses on continental defensive strategies. These
strategies, for most of its history, have
been abandoned by statesmen upholding Australia’s extended vital interests
in a favorable regional and world order.
In other words, Australian military
strategists instinctively think about
homeland defense, especially of the air
and sea-lanes connecting Australia to
the world, but their political leaders inevitably require them to adapt their
strategies to intervening around the
world as a member of coalitions of
like-minded liberal democracies. In the
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United States, we call this a “policystrategy mismatch,” but Evans calls it
the “tyranny of dissonance,” with the
interventionist tradition of Australian
foreign policy pulling one way and the
more isolationist official Australian
military strategy pulling another. In
that respect, Australia resembles Britain
and the United States, which have also
been torn between “splendid isolation”
and foreign intervention in different
periods of their histories.
Evans is as relentless as a fly at a picnic
in the Australian outback in demonstrating his thesis, which makes his style
sometimes just as annoying. He might
have limited his analysis to a few archetypal case studies and so made his point
with greater power in fewer words. He
does prove, however, that both the geographical position and unique political
culture of Australia have inclined its
military leaders to treat their continent
as an Anglo-Saxon island in the middle
of Asia, one that needed to be isolated
from the rough-and-tumble of regional
and global conflicts. Time and again,
however, Australia’s dependence on
great powers (first Britain, then the
United States), as well as the broader vision of Australian political leaders,
compelled it to adopt a coalition strategy of “limited liability.” Both to avoid
overextension and to demonstrate their
bona fides to Australia’s allies, statesmen “down under” have consistently
made limited commitments to imperial,
later international, security in World
War I, World War II, Korea, Vietnam,
the Persian Gulf, Afghanistan, and Iraq.
Like more unilateral interventions in
East Timor and the Solomon Islands,
these expeditions demonstrate that official Australian defense strategy is often
out of sync with Australian foreign
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